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1 Introduction
Since at least Stigler (1961), it is widely acknowledged that search frictions reduce workers’
ability to generate wage competition between potential employers to attach labour services.
This should result in employers’ monopsony power, and wage dispersion for homogenous workers.
Given the strength of this idea, the magnitude of residual wage dispersion found in most empirical
studies1, and the huge amount of progress achieved in job search theory, one would expect the
theory to be now able to oﬀer equilibrium wage distributions for homogenous workers that can
replicate empirical regularities. In particular, the density of such wage distributions should
be hump-shaped/single-peaked. And indeed, many structural estimates have been performed
on the grounds of search equilibrium models. Surprisingly, many such estimates are based on
equilibrium wage distributions which do not have good empirical properties. On top of that,
the basic search models are generally unable to generate wage dispersion.
The main problem has been identified by Diamond (1971). If there is random search (or
undirected search), firms have no reason to oﬀer a wage above the common reservation wage,
because it does not alter their rate of contact. In equilibrium, the wage thus collapses to
unemployment income. Directed search models first introduced by Hosios (1990), Montgomery
(1991), and Moen (1997), aim to solve this paradox. The search market is segmented by wage.
Workers can choose which jobs they send their application to — or, alternatively, which market
they prospect —, while the probability to get a job is a decreasing function of the length of the job
queue. Wage competition thus takes place at the time of wage/market choice. In equilibrium,
all wage oﬀers must yield the same utility: if not, the jobs would not be prospected. This
implies that the employment (recruitment) probability is a decreasing (an increasing) function
of the wage. Typically, there is a unique wage oﬀer balancing workers’ marginal cost derived
from searching higher wage firms (a lower employment probability) and their marginal benefit
(a better wage once employed). Thus, workers receive more than their reservation wage, but
there is still a unique wage oﬀer. Put diﬀerently, the wage distribution is degenerate.
Given the inability of the basic models to generate wage dispersion, papers which aim to oﬀer
microfoundations to the wage distribution have been led to dramatically alter the seminal as-
sumptions. Three groups of papers can be distinguished. First, there are papers which introduce
on-the-job search. If workers search on-the-job, reservation wages are heterogeneous. Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) show that this heterogeneity in reservation wages sustain the existence
of a non-degenerate wage distribution with random search. However, the density of the wage
distribution is counterfactually strictly increasing. De la Croix and Shi (forthcoming) consider
a directed search version. They show that the density of the wage oﬀer distribution is strictly
decreasing. In addition, at given initial wage, all workers prospect the same jobs, which means
they all receive the same wage in case of hiring. Second, there are papers which introduce firms’
heterogeneity. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) do so while estimating the Burdett-Mortensen
model. Mortensen (2000) endogenizes productivity choices in the same model. Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002a) also endogenize firms’ heterogeneity, but in a model where employers can
react to other firms approaching their workers by making a counteroﬀer (see also Postel-Vinay
and Robin, 2002b). Those papers manage to generate a hump-shaped wage distribution, but
1Autor and Katz (1999) show that simple regressions of the log of the wage on individual characteristics like
education, age/experience, gender and location leave unexplained the two thirds of the variance. Of course, part
of the residual wage dispersion resorts to unobserved heterogeneity.
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of course at the cost of assuming ex-ante heterogeneity2. In a close framework, but with only
ex-post heterogeneity (i.e. when the quality of the match is revealed), Moscarini (2005) shows
that it is possible to arrive at a wage distribution with good empirical properties (unimodal,
skewed, with a Paretian right tail) with a simple Gaussian output noise. Third, there are pa-
pers which modifiy the matching technology so that a worker can receive multiple oﬀers at the
same time. Thus, wage competition takes place at the time of choosing between diﬀerent job
oﬀers. This way to analyze the search process is very close to Stigler’s original insight. In
Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), firms post wages and workers choose the number of costly oﬀers
they receive. Acemoglu and Shimer show that there is equilibrium wage dispersion. However,
the density of the wage oﬀer distribution is strictly decreasing with a mass point at its upper
bound. In a similar vein, Galenianos and Kircher (2005) consider the directed search model of
Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2005) in which firms post wages and the workers send multiple
applications. Unlike Albrecht et al, Galenianos and Kircher assume that firms commit to pay
the posted wage irrespective of the number of job oﬀers received by the applicant3. They also
obtain a strictly decreasing density of the wage distribution.
Our paper follows a diﬀerent route. It remains in the tradition of wage-posting models
with directed search such as Moen (1997). However, it modifies one of the crucial assumptions:
workers are not attached to a single market. They rationally prospect jobs oﬀering diﬀerent
wages, and, therefore, firms oﬀer diﬀerent wages in equilibrium. They do so because market-
specific return to search is strictly decreasing. In standard directed search models, search eﬀorts
for diﬀerent wages are perfectly substitutable. It means that the market-specific marginal return
to search investment is independent on the level of search investment. That is why workers send
all their applications to the same market, i.e. to jobs paying the same wage. Put diﬀerently, the
specification of the search technology implies that workers are bound to search jobs on one and
only one market. In our paper, the marginal return to search investment is strictly decreasing on
each market. Hence, workers can oﬀset a lower return at given search intensity by a lower search
intensity. It leads them to participate to a continuum of markets: they are, in this respect,
ubiquitous.
In this setting, we obtain (i) a non-degenerate wage distribution, and (ii) a single-peaked
density of the wage oﬀer distribution as natural outcomes.
The main results can be explained as follows. The path of market-specific search investment
reflects the path of market-specific return to search. As the return to search first increases
with wage, and then decreases, search investment evolves non-monotonously with the wage. It
reaches its maximum at the only wage that would exist in the standard directed search model.
In turn, the number of vacancies on each market reacts to two eﬀects. First, it tends to decrease
with the wage, as paying higher wages must be compensated by lower search costs, and thus
longer job queues. Second, it tends to increase with the number of eﬀective job-seekers, because
recruitment rates depend on the ratio of vacancies to eﬀective number of job-seekers. As a
result, the number of vacancies tends to adopt the path of market-specific search investment.
The combination of these two eﬀects implies that the number of vacancies is first increasing,
and then decreasing in wage. It follows that the density of the wage oﬀer distribution is hump-
2Of course, this may be the correct story: there can be wage dispersion among homogenous workers because
firms are heterogenous, no matter whether firms’ heterogeneity is endogenous or not. Our purpose, however, is
to generate wage dispersion with homogenous agents on both sides of the market.
3Put otherwise, firms cannot react to other oﬀers by increasing their initial wage in Galenianos and Kircher,
while they can in Albrecht et al.
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shaped. Finally, the actual wage distribution can be deduced from the wage oﬀer distribution
and the knowledge of search investments. Its density is also single-peaked.
The wage distributions are also consistent with another property of empirical wage distri-
butions: right-skewness. More precisely, the density of the wage oﬀer distribution is always
right-skewed, while the density of the actual wage distribution may or may not be right-skewed.
All these properties are illustrated by an example, in which the matching technology is Cobb-
Douglas, and the eﬃciency of search eﬀort is isoelastic. We show that both the wage oﬀer
distribution and the actual wage oﬀer distribution follow a Beta distribution.
Our paper matches two distinct ideas that have been previoulsy investigated in the literature
on search unemployment. First, the search market is segmented by wage, and individuals choose
which wage/job to prospect. We discussed below the importance of such an idea in the directed
search literature. Second, individuals simultaneously participate to diﬀerent segments of the
search market. This idea is increasingly popular in models interested in two-sided heterogeneity.
The search market is segmented by job type, and workers choose the subset of sub-markets
they participate. In models on overeducation, educated workers seek both complex and simple
positions while uneducated workers only search simple jobs (see Gautier, 2002). In models with
multidimensional skills, workers have a bundle of skills and participate to sub-markets on the
basis of comparative advantage (see Moscarini, 2001), or on the basis of their ability to perform
on the underlying technologies (see Charlot, Decreuse and Granier, 2005).
Wage segmentation is a natural extension of job segmentation: diﬀerent jobs are usually
associated to diﬀerent wages, so that individuals actually perceive job segmentation as wage
segmentation. It is worth discussing the impact of this assumption in terms of congestion
externalities. In our model, vacancies oﬀering diﬀerent wages do not create congestion eﬀects
to each other. An additional oﬀer at 40,000 euro a year does not reduce the probability to fill a
position oﬀering 30,000 euro a year at given search intensities. However, the former oﬀer raises
the welfare of the unemployed. In response, the unemployed reduce their eﬀort to get the latter
wage oﬀer. As a consequence, the probability to fill the latter position is lower. This argument
may seem a bit more diﬃcult to accept when one imagines the case of a 40,000 euro a year
position versus a 39,999 euro a year position. Continuous segmentation is an assumption made
for simplicity. We believe that accounting for discrete segmentation would not alter our main
results4.
Wage dispersion reflects employers’ monopsony power in our setting5. However, it also
ensures the segmentation of the search place into a continuum of sub-markets. Wages, therefore,
have two roles. On the one hand, they have the traditional function to allocate the economywide
resources between consumption (workers’ income) and investment (vacancy costs, which absorb
firms’ profits given that there is free entry on the search market). On the other hand, wages
shape the technological structure of the search market, that is the number of places that can
be visited simultaneously by the job-seekers. These two diﬀerent roles assigned to a unique
instrument suggest that the decentralized outcome is ineﬃcient, a result that deeply diﬀers from
4Accounting for discrete segmentation would raise an important issue: how could one endogenize the diﬀerent
wage thresholds delimiting the diﬀerent market segments? Is this a problem of information (it may be necessary
to save on search costs to aggregate 30,000 euro to 35,000 euro positions), or preference (30,000 euro to 35,000
euro positions oﬀer similar standards of living, while a 40,000 euro position may change the life of the family).
Interestingly, models of segmentation by job type implicitly face similar problems: what is the diﬀerence between
simple jobs and complex jobs?
5Of course, the wage distribution collapses when matching frictions disappear.
4
Moen (1997) where workers are attached to a single market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model in which workers can
choose their search intensity, but are bound to choose one and only one search market. We
call the associated equilibrium concept the localized search equilibrium, which is basically the
equilibrium of a standard directed search model with search intensity. In Section 3, workers
are no longer obliged to choose a particular market. We call the associated equilibrium concept
the ubiquitous search equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted to the study of the equilibrium wage
distributions. Section 5 studies the eﬃciency of the decentralized outcome. Section 6 concludes.
All the proofs are in the appendix.
2 Localized search
What we call a localized search equilibrium is a version of Moen’s (1997) competitive search
equilibrium in which search eﬀort is made endogenous.
2.1 Search technology
Our model follows the lines of the wage posting search model developed, among others, by
Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). In this framework, firms post vacancies with
non-negotiable wages. The workers, knowing all the posted wages, choose the amount of eﬀort
they will spend to search for a job. While making this choice, they are aware that if they decide
to search for a job oﬀering a wage w, they will compete with other workers seeking for the same
wage. Symmetrically, if a firm posts a vacancy associated with the wage w, it will compete
to attract workers with the other firms oﬀering the same wage. In other words, for each wage
w, workers face a specific queue length and vacant jobs have a specific probability to be filled.
For Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), such a representation of the search process recognizes that
the labor market is segmented by wages and that search frictions exist within each particular
sub-market (or island).
As in Moen (1997), we assume that an unemployed person is bound to search for a job
on one and only one island. This is the reason why we use the term “localized” to label our
equilibrium concept. Thus, the search process consists in two stages: 1) firms post wages, 2)
each unemployed chooses on which sub-market she will search for a job and decides upon the
amount of search eﬀort she will spend on the previously chosen sub-market.
An unemployed person whose search eﬀort is s bears the cost c(s), but increasing eﬀort
provides more contacts with potential employers. In such a perspective, we will distinguish the
amount of search eﬀort from the eﬃciency of such an eﬀort. When a job-seeker invests an
amount of eﬀort s, the eﬃciency of this eﬀort is measured by the function x (s). In the sequel,
we make the following assumption on the functions c(s) and x(s) influencing the search process.
Assumption A1 The cost of eﬀort function c : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is strictly increasing,
convex, twice diﬀerentiable, and satisfies c (0) = 0, c0 (0) = c0 > 0, and c0 (+∞) = +∞.
The eﬃciency of eﬀort function x : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) is strictly increasing, strictly concave,
twice diﬀerentiable, and satisfies x (0) = 0, x0 (0) = +∞, and x0 (+∞) = 0.
It is worth to notice that the assumption made on the cost of eﬀort function authorized this
function to be linear, i.e. of the form c0 · s. The marginal cost of search eﬀort is increasing,
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while the marginal productivity of search eﬀort is strictly decreasing. The diﬀerence between
the search eﬀort and its eﬃciency can be illustrated by the following example. Imagine that the
search eﬀort is measured by the time s spent in acquiring information on available vacancies
and writing letters that are sent to potential employers. Then x (s) represents the number of
letters written during a time interval of length s. Assumption A1 states that the technology of
information acquisition exhibits marginal decreasing returns. This assumption reflects the fact
that it is more and more diﬃcult to find additional vacancies on a particular market.
It is important to realize that this technology is (sub)market-specific, while the cost of search
depends on the overall search eﬀort. This distinction between market-specific and overall search
eﬀort is not useful in the localized search model, where workers must choose one and only
one market before searching a job. However, the fact that there is a search technology with
decreasing marginal returns on each market will be crucial in the ubiquitous search model of
section 3.
A sub-market may be either closed — when no one enters this sub-market — or opened. Which
sub-markets are closed and which sub-markets are opened is an outcome of the model. When
there are u(w) unemployed persons searching on the sub-market oﬀering the wage w, and if the
search eﬀort of an individual on this sub-market reaches s(w), the overall eﬃcient search eﬀort
on this sub-market amounts to x(w)u(w) where x(w) ≡ x [s(w)] is the market-specific mean
eﬃcient search intensity. With v(w) vacancies oﬀering the wage w, the flow number of matches
on island w is equal to M [x(w)u(w), v(w)], where the matching function satisfies the following
(standard) assumption:
Assumption A2 The technology M : [0,+∞) × [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in each of its arguments, strictly concave and linearly homoge-
nous. It satisfies the boundary conditions M (U, 0) = M (0, V ) = 0, and lim
U→+∞
M(U, V ) =
lim
V→+∞
M(U, V ) = +∞.
Let m (θ) ≡M (1/θ, 1). The flow probability for a vacant job oﬀering the wage w to meet a
job-seeker is:
m [θ (w)] ≡ M [x(w)u(w), v(w)]
v(w)
,
while the flow probability for a job seeker to meet a vacant job per eﬃcient unit of search is:
θ (w)m [θ (w)] ≡ M [x(w)u(w), v(w)]
x(w)u(w)
.
In these formulas, θ (w) ≡ v (w) /x (w)u(w) represents the market-specific tightness, that is
the tightness specific to the island w.
2.2 Agents’ behaviour
We study the steady state of a continuous time economy. There are a continuum of identical
and infinitely-lived firms and workers. Each firm is associated with only one job. The measure
of workers is normalized to one, while the measure of firms is endogenously determined through
entry. Both are risk neutral and discount time at instantaneous rate r. Jobs can be either
filled or vacant, while workers can be either employed or unemployed. A pair of worker/firm
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produces a flow output y until (exogenous) separation at rate q. Unemployed workers enjoy
unemployment income z, 0 ≤ z < y, while firms endowed with a vacancy bear the flow cost h.
Following Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), we assume that workers observe
all posted wage w and corresponding market tightness θ(w). Workers decide which sub-market
to enter on the basis of this knowledge. Let Vu(w) and Ve (w) denote respectively, the value of
unemployment and the value of employment on the sub-market oﬀering the wage w. The asset
value equations for Ve (w) and Vu(w) are given by:
rVe(w) = w + q [Vu(w)− Ve(w)] (1)
rVu(w) = max
s
{z − c(s) + x (s) θ (w)m [θ (w)] [Ve(w)− Vu(w)]} (2)
Let us denote by R (w) ≡ rVu (w) the flow gain of an unemployed. The optimal search
investment s (w) responds to:
c0 [s(w)] = x0 [s(w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R (w)
r + q
(3)
R(w) = z − c [s (w)] + x [s (w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)] w −R (w)
r + q
(4)
The asset values of a vacancy advertised at wage w, denoted Πv(w), and of a filled job paying
w, denoted Πe(w), satisfy the arbitrage equations:
rΠv(w) = −h+m [θ (w)] [Πe(w)−Πv(w)] , rΠe(w) = y − w + q [Πv(w)−Πe(w)] (5)
Consequently, when an entrepreneur decides to post the wage w, her expected gain is given
by:
rΠv(w) =
−h(r + q) +m [θ (w)] (y − w)
r + q +m [θ (w)]
(6)
The main consequence of the assumption of localized search, according to which an unem-
ployed is constrained to search for a job on one and only one sub-market, is that competition
between employers to attract workers oblige firms to oﬀer the same expected utility for the
unemployed on each opened sub-market. Let us denote by Vu this common value, and by
R = rVu = max
w
R (w) the associated reservation wage. This has two implications.
First, the search eﬀort is the same on all opened sub-markets. Formally, let Ω ∈ [R, y] be
the set of opened sub-markets. For all w ∈ Ω, equations (3) and (4) imply that
R = z − c [s(w)] + c0 [s(w)] x [s(w)]
x0 [s(w)]
(7)
Assumption A1 implies that, for a given R ≥ z, there exists a unique search eﬀort s(w)
which is solution of equation (7). This optimal search eﬀort does not depend on w, and we will
denote it by σ(R). It is easy to check that σ0(R) > 0.
Second, the fact that a sub-market is opened in equilibrium means its tightness must have
some optimality property from workers’ perspective. Such tightness is monotonously related to
workers’ common reservation wage. Formally, for all w ∈ Ω, equations (3) and (7) give:
c0 [σ(R)] = x0 [σ(R)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
(8)
This equality implicitly defines tightness as a function θ(w,R) of the workers’ reservation
wage. It is easy to check that θR (w,R) > 0.
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2.3 Localized search equilibrium
For each sub-market, firms must make expectations concerning the associated market tightness.
Given that only a subset of potential sub-markets will be opened in equilibrium, such expec-
tations concern both equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium outcomes. We shall denote by eθ (w)
firms’ common expectation on the pattern by wage of market tightness. In the sequel, we will
restrain ourselves to the following hypothesis.
Assumption A3 Let R ≥ 0 be given. Firms’ expectations are given by
eθ (w) = ½ θ (w,R) if w ∈ [R, y]
0 elsewhere
.
The idea is the following. Firms have no reason to post a wage on a sub-market that will
not be prospected by the job-seekers. Yet, they must assign a value to the tightness variable
when evaluating the opportunity to post a wage on a particular sub-market. They rationally
expect that if this sub-market were opened, it would be consistent with workers’ maximisation
process. Consequently, when an entrepreneur chooses to post a wage equal to w, she considers,
for a given reservation wage R, that the corresponding eﬀort σ(R) and market tightness θ(w)
must satisfy the system of equations (7) and (8).
On the basis of this expectation eθ(w), each entrepreneur maximizes her expected gain Πv(w)
given by (6). Diﬀerentiating Πv(w) with respect to w and setting this derivative to zero yields:n
m0
heθ (w)ieθ0 (w) (y −w)−m heθ (w)ionr + q +m heθ (w)io
+m0
heθ (w)ieθ0 (w)n−h(r + q) +m heθ (w)i (y − w)o = 0
The free-entry condition, Πv(w) = 0, implies that the last term between brackets vanishes
and the optimal market wage is characterized by the following equation:
α
³eθ (w)´ eθ0 (w)eθ (w) = − 1y − w (9)
where α (θ) = −θm0 (θ) /m (θ) ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of the recruitment rate with respect
to the market tightness.
On the other hand, diﬀerentiating relation (8) with respect to w, one gets:
eθ0 (w)eθ (w) = θw (w,R)θ (w,R) = − 1[1− α (θ (w,R))] (w −R)
Substituting this expression of eθ0 (w) /eθ (w) into (9) gives the optimal market wage as a function
of the reservation wage R and the market tightness eθ(w):
w = α
³eθ (w)´ y + h1− α³eθ (w)´iR (10)
In equilibrium, free entry implies the exhaustion of all rents and Πv(w) = 0. Equation (6)
implies that the market tightness θ (w) must satisfy:
m [θ (w)] =
h(r + q)
y − w (11)
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The consistency of expectations implies that eθ (w) = θ (w) in equilibrium. This yields
w = α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R (12)
Interestingly, the following Lemma shows that this equation defines a unique wage for a given
R.
Lemma 1 Let φ : [0, y]×R→ R be such that
φ(w,R) ≡ α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R− w with θ (w) = m−1
∙
h(r + q)
y −w
¸
,
For all R ∈ [0, y], φ (w,R) = 0 has a unique root in w.
The properties of the localized search equilibrium are summarized in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1 The localized search equilibrium
Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3,
(i) A localized search equilibrium is characterized by a triplet (θ∗, s∗, w∗, R∗) corresponding to
the equilibrium value of the wage, the flow gain of an unemployed and the labor market tightness
that satisfies:
m (θ) =
h(r + q)
y −w (13)
c0 (s) = x0 (s) θm (θ)
w −R
r + q
(14)
R = z − c (s) + x (s) θm (θ) w −R
r + q
(15)
w = α (θ) y + [1− α (θ)]R (16)
(ii) There exists a unique localized search equilibrium.
Using equations (13) to (16), it is possible to show that s∗ and θ∗ are the solutions of the
following system:
h
m (θ∗)
=
[1− α (θ∗)] [y − z + c (s∗)]
r + q + x(s∗)α (θ∗) θ∗m (θ∗)
, c0 (s∗) =
α (θ∗)
1− α (θ∗)hθ
∗x0 (s∗) (17)
These two last equations will prove useful while studying the eﬃciency properties of the
localized search equilibrium (see Proposition 7 in Section 5).
To end characterizing the localized search equilibrium, it remains to define the unemployment
rate. As the equilibrium wage is unique, there is a unique opened (sub-)market. On this market,
the job finding rate, denoted by λ∗, is given by:
λ∗ = x [σ(R∗)] θ∗m(θ∗),
9
and the equilibrium unemployment rate, denoted by u∗, stems from the equality between
the flows in and out of employment, i.e. q(1− u∗) = λ∗u∗. Finally, one has:
u∗ =
q
q + λ∗
For our purpose, the important result is that there is a unique equilibrium wage when the
job search process is localized. We now consider the labour market equilibrium when we relax
the assumption of localized search according to which there is indivisibility of search investments
between sub-markets.
3 Ubiquitous search
3.1 Agents’ behaviour with ubiquity
As in the previous section, the search market is segmented by wage. The behavior of the en-
trepreneurs remains unchanged, i.e. firms post vacancies with associated non-negotiable wages.
However, we now assume that an unemployed person is able to search simultaneously on every
existing sub-market. Hence, there is ubiquity on the search market: a job-seeker is not bound
to search on only one sub-market. Importantly, ubiquity means that the worker has to decide
the search investment on every existing sub-market.
If there are u unemployed persons in the economy, the overall search eﬀort on the sub-
market oﬀering the wage w now amounts to x(w)u where x(w) still denotes the market-specific
mean eﬃciency of search eﬀorts. With v(w) vacancies oﬀering the wage w, the flow number of
matches on sub-market w is equal toM [x(w)u, v(w)], where the matching function still satisfies
Assumption A2. Consequently, the flow probability for a vacant job to meet a job-seeker and
the flow probability for a job-seeker to meet a vacant job per eﬃcient unit of search on the
sub-market oﬀering the wage w are given by:
m [θ (w)] ≡ M [x(w)u, v(w)]
v(w)
, θ (w)m [θ (w)] ≡ M [x(w)u, v(w)]
x(w)u
,
where market-specific tightness is now defined by θ (w) ≡ v (w) / (x (w)u).
Let us denote by Vu the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed individual. If this person
takes a job paying w, she obtains the lifetime utility Ve(w) described by the arbitrage equation:
rVe(w) = w + q [Vu − Ve(w)]
It follows that the reservation wage, R, is always such that R = rVu. A priori, the set of
possible wages — equivalently, the set of islands — covers the entire interval [z, y], but the set
of islands that will be visited belongs to the interval [R, y]. Like in the previous section, each
job-seeker observes the posted wage w and the corresponding labor market tightness θ (w) on
each sub-market.
But now, an unemployed person has to choose the set {s(w)} of search eﬀorts that she will
simultaneously exert on each sub-market w. Let us denote by S =
R y
R s (w) dw the total search
eﬀort, the expected gain of a job seeker reads:
rVu = max
s(.)
½
z − c (S) +
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)] [Ve(w)− Vu] dw
¾
(18)
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On sub-market w, the optimal search eﬀort of an unemployed person is thus characterized
by the first-order condition:
c0(S) = x0 [s(w)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
w −R
r + q
, for all w ∈ [R, y] (19)
And the equation (18) defining Vu becomes:
R = z − c(S) +
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
w −R
r + q
dw (20)
The first-order condition (19) states that, in every sub-market, the marginal cost of searching
for a job must be equal to the marginal gain of this activity. This relation highlights the fact that
the search technology x(s) must exhibit marginal decreasing returns to obtain a definite search
eﬀort associated with each sub-market. Indeed, under constant marginal returns to search, a
job-seeker would allocate her whole search investment to the sub-market that yields the largest
reward. Such a sub-market oﬀers the best combination of wage and employment probability, i.e.
it maximizes the product θ (w)m (θ (w)) (w −R). Hence, despite workers would be allowed to
search on several sub-markets at a time, they would not use this possibility and only one market
would be opened. This result does not hold anymore with marginal decreasing returns in the
search technology. A worker can then compensate a lower reward by investing less, which raises
the marginal productivity of search eﬀort and leaves the marginal benefit to search unchanged.
Consequently, there is no longer a unique value of the search eﬀort: the search investment
varies on each prospected sub-market. Moreover, equations (19) and (20) imply that the reser-
vation wage R and the collection of search eﬀorts {s (w)} are linked by
R = z − c(S) + c0(S)
Z y
R
x [s (w)]
x0 [s (w)]
dw (21)
S =
Z y
R
s (w) dw (22)
As in the localized search case, the fact that the worker spends s (w) on a particular sub-market
means that the associated market tightness must have some optimality property which induces
such a choice from the worker. When ubiquitous search is possible, it means that tightness
on each sub-market must satisfy equation (19). This equation defines tightness as a function
θ (w,R, {s (w)}) in which the reservation wage R and the set of search eﬀorts {s (w)} are linked
by (21) and (22).
3.2 Ubiquitous search equilibrium
As in the localized search case, for each sub-market, firms must make expectations concerning
the associated tightness. We shall still denote by eθ (w) firms’ common expectation on the pattern
by wage of market tightness. We consider the following assumption.
Assumption A3’ Let R ≥ z and {s (w)}w≥R such that (21) and (22) hold. Firms’ expectations
are given by eθ (w) = ½ θ (w,R, {s (w)}) if w ∈ [R, y]
0 elsewhere
.
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Assumption A3’ is a mere adaptation of Assumption A3 in the context of ubiquitous search.
First, firms have no reason to post a wage on a sub-market that will not be prospected by the
job-seekers. Second, they must assign a value to the tightness variable when evaluating the
opportunity to post a wage on a particular sub-market. They rationally expect that if this sub-
market were opened, it would be consistent with workers’ maximisation process. Consequently,
when an entrepreneur chooses to post a wage equal to w, she considers that, for a given reser-
vation wage R and a given collection {s (w)}w≥R of search eﬀorts satisfying (21) and (22), the
market tigthness must satisfy the equation (19).
The asset valuesΠv(w) andΠe(w) of a vacancy posting a wage w and of a filled job paying this
wage are still defined by the relations (5). Each entrepreneur can then maximize her expected
gain Πv(w) given by (6). Formally, the entrepreneur’s problem is the same as in the case with
localized search. Thus, when the free-entry condition Πv(w) = 0 is satisfied, the equilibrium
value of the market tightness function θ (w) is still given by equation (11) for any wage in the
interval [R, y].
Proposition 2 The ubiquitous search equilibrium
Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3’,
(i) An ubiquitous search equilibrium is characterized by a quadruplet (θ∗(w), s∗(w), S∗, R∗)
corresponding to the equilibrium value of the labor market tightness function, the search eﬀort
function, the global eﬀort and the flow gain of an unemployed, that satisfies:
m [θ(w)] =
h(r + q)
y − w , ∀w ∈ [R, y] (23)
c0(S) = x0 [s(w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
,∀w ∈ [R, y] (24)
R = z − c(S) +
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
w −R
r + q
dw (25)
S =
Z y
R
s (w) dw (26)
(ii) There exists a unique ubiquitous search equilibrium.
To end characterizing the ubiquitous search equilibrium, it remains to define the unemploy-
ment rate. The job-finding rate is worth
λ =
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m [θ(w)] dw,
that is the sum of the diﬀerent rates of contact over the diﬀerent markets the job-seekers
prospect. Unemployment can then be computed from the equality between flows in and out of
unemployment: q(1− u) = λu. The unemployment rate is worth u = q/ (q + λ).
We now turn to the properties of the equilibrium.
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3.3 Market-specific search investment
Diﬀerentiating the logarithm of both sides of equation (24) with respect to w, we get:
x00 [s(w)]
x0 [s(w)]
s0(w) +
θ0(w)
θ(w)
[1− α (θ (w))] + 1
w −R = 0, (27)
while diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to w still gives (9). Then, eliminating θ0(w)/θ(w)
between (27) and (9) one obtains:
s0 (w) ≡ − x
0 [s(w)]
x00 [s(w)]
α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R− w
α (θ (w)) (y −w)(w −R) (28)
The wage has two conflicting eﬀects on search eﬀort. On the one hand, there is a positive
direct eﬀect. At given market tightness, a higher wage raises the return to search, thereby
motivating search investment. On the other hand, there is a negative indirect eﬀect. Indeed,
market tightness decreases with the wage. A higher wage deteriorates the search prospects,
thereby reducing search investment. Therefore the sign of s0 (w) seems ambiguous. We can go
further by noticing that the function φ(w,R) defined in Lemma 1 appears at the right side of
equation (28). More precisely, one can see that s0 (w) has the same sign as φ(w,R). This remark
enables us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The pattern of search investment
Under Assumptions A1 to A3, the eﬀort function s : [R, y] → [0,+∞) is ∩-shaped and
satisfies s (R) = s (y) = 0
The key finding of Proposition 3 is the non-monotonicity of the relationship between wage
and search investment depicted by Figure 1. The pattern of search investment reflects the
pattern of marginal reward to search. Remind such reward consists in a peculiar combination
of wage and employment probability. Search investment is thus very small at both low and high
wages. In the former case, employment probability is large, but it is not worth to invest a lot
as the wage is close to the reservation wage. In the latter case, the wage may be very good,
but job opportunities collapse. More generally, the direct positive eﬀect of the wage on search
investment dominates at low wages, while the indirect negative eﬀect due to lower tightness
dominates at higher wages. The search investment then reaches a maximum on the market
where the reward is the highest.
Let us denote by w1(R) the root of equation φ (w,R) = 0 that gives the largest search invest-
ment (see Figure 1). This wage is defined by w1(R) = α [θ (w1(R))] y + {1− α [θ (w1(R))]}R.
For R given, this wage is actually the only wage oﬀer in the localized search equilibrium.
4 Wage distributions with ubiquity
The purpose of this section is to analyse the shape of the wage distribution that is implied by our
model. We proceed in three steps. First, we focus on the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution.
Second, we analyse the wage distribution among employed workers. Third, we consider an
example.
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Figure 1: Search investment by wage
4.1 The wage oﬀer distribution
The number of vacancies advertised at wage w is worth v(w) = θ (w)x [s (w)]u, where u repre-
sents the unemployment rate. The total number of vacancies is thus v =
R y
R v (w) dw. The cdf
and the pdf of the wage oﬀer distribution are then defined by
F (w) =
R w
R v (ξ) dξ
v
, F 0 (w) =
v(w)
v
= θ (w)x [s (w)]
u
v
(29)
How does the density change with the wage? Taking the second derivative of F yields
F 00 (w)
F 0 (w)
≡ θ
0 (w)
θ (w)
+
x0 [s (w)] s0(w)
x [s (w)]
(30)
The density of the wage oﬀer distribution is the result of two main factors: the pattern of market
tightness by wage on the one hand, and the pattern of search investment by wage on the other
hand. Hence, the right-hand side of equation (30) is composed of two terms. The first term is
negative and reflects the fact that tightness is strictly decreasing in wage. Due to this term,
the density of the wage oﬀer distribution tends to decrease with the wage as the number of job
oﬀers per unit of search declines when the wage raises. The second term depicts the influence
of search investments. It is non-monotonous, reflecting the non-monotonicity of s (w). More
precisely, it is positive at wages close to the lower bound of the support [R, y] of the wage oﬀer
distribution, while it becomes negative at wages close to the upper bound.
With the help of (9) and (28), we have:
F 00 (w)
F 0 (w)
=
γ(w) {α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R− w}− (w −R)
α (θ (w)) (y −w)(w −R) (31)
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with γ(w) = − x
02[s(w)]
x[s(w)]x00[s(w)] > 0. It appears that F
00(w) has the same sign as the function
ψ(w,R) ≡ γ(w)φ(w,R) − (w − R). Hence, the properties of the wage oﬀer distribution will
depend on the number of roots of the equation ψ(w,R) = 0. The following assumption will be
useful to obtain more precise results.
Assumption A4 Let ψ : [0, y]×R→ R be such that
ψ(w,R) = γ(w)φ(w,R)− (w −R)
For all R ∈ [0, y], ψ(w,R) = 0 has a unique root in w.
One can check that this assumption is satisfied with a Cobb-Douglas matching function (α
is then a constant) and with an iso-elastic eﬃciency search function (γ is then a constant).
Proposition 4 Properties of the wage offer distribution
Under Assumptions A1 to A3,
(i) Non-monotonicity. The wage oﬀer distribution F : [R, y]→ [0, 1] is non-monotonous and
satisfies F 0 (R) = F 0 (y) = 0.
(ii) Single-peak. If in addition A4 holds, the wage oﬀer distribution is ∩-shaped
(iii) Right-skewness. If lim
θ→0
α (θ) > 0 and lim
w→y
γ (w) <∞, F 00 (y) = 0
We obtain three results. First, the density of the wage oﬀer distribution is non-monotonous.
This is in sharp contrast with the literature discussed in the introduction, which predicts either
increasing or decreasing density of the wage oﬀer distribution. Actually, the result is induced
by the non-monotonicity of the pattern of search investment by wage level. If search investment
could not vary with the wage, the density of the wage oﬀer distribution would be strictly de-
creasing, only reflecting the decreasing pattern of tightness with respect to the wage. Note that
ψ(w1(R), R) < 0: the peak of the wage oﬀer distribution corresponds to a lower wage than the
peak of the search investment function. This reflects the fact that tightness is strictly decreasing
in wage. Second, the density is single-peaked provided some additional (yet not too demanding)
restrictions on the matching technology and the eﬃciency of eﬀort function hold. Third, the
wage oﬀer distribution generally has a flat tail at its upper bound.
4.2 The actual wage distribution
As search intensity varies with the wage level, the actual wage distribution (i.e. the distribu-
tion of wages among the employees, which coincides with the wage distribution among newly
employed workers) departs from the wage oﬀer distribution. Let G(w) be the cdf of the actual
wage distribution among the employees. It can be deduced from a standard flow equilibrium
reasoning. For each wage w ∈ [R, y], the outflow from the pool of those employed who earn less
than w equals the inflow from the pool of unemployed. This reads:
q(1− u)G(w) = u
Z w
R
x [s(ξ] θ(ξ)m [θ(ξ)] dξ
Since q(1− u) = λu, remembering that v (w) = vF 0 (w) = x [s (w)] θ(w)u it comes:
G(w) =
v
λu
Z w
R
F 0(ξ)m [θ(ξ)] dξ
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Thus one has:
G0(w) =
v
λu
F 0(w)m [θ(w)] (32)
Diﬀerentiating this latter equality with respect to w and taking into account (9) gives:
G00 (w)
G0 (w)
=
F 00 (w)
F 0 (w)
− α (θ (w)) θ
0 (w)
θ (w)
=
F 00 (w)
F 0 (w)
+
1
y − w (33)
Using relations (31) that defines F 00(w), one arrives at:
G00 (w)
G0 (w)
=
ψ(w,R) + α (θ (w)) (w −R)
α (θ (w)) (y − w)(w −R) (34)
It appears thatG00(w) has the same sign as the function χ(w,R) ≡ ψ(w,R)+α (θ (w)) (w−R).
Hence, the properties of the actual wage distribution will depend on the number of roots of the
equation χ(w,R) = 0. The following assumption will be useful to obtain more precise results.
Assumption A5 Let ψ : [0, y]×R→ R be such that
χ(w,R) = ψ(w,R) + α (θ (w)) (w −R)
For all R ∈ [0, y], χ(w,R) = 0 has a unique root in w.
One can check that this assumption is satisfied with a Cobb-Douglas matching function (α
is then a constant) and with a iso-elastic eﬃciency search function (γ is then a constant).
Proposition 5 Properties of the actual wage distribution
Under Assumptions A1 to A3,
(i) Non-monotonicity. The actual wage distribution G : [R, y] → [0, 1] is non-monotonous
and satisfies G0 (R) = G0 (y) = 0.
(ii) Stochastic dominance. G (w) < F (w) for all w ∈ (R, y)
(iii) Single-peak. If in addition A5 holds, the actual wage distribution is ∩-shaped
Like the wage oﬀer distribution, the actual wage distribution features properties that are
remarkably consistent with the facts: non-monotonous and generally single-peaked. However,
unlike the wage oﬀer distribution, skewness, though a possible output, is not a systematic
property of the actual wage distribution. Note that the wage oﬀer distribution first-order sto-
chastically dominates the actual wage distribution. It means that individuals confronted with
both distributions would unambiguously choose the latter. Such result is not very surprising:
the job-seekers observe the wage oﬀer distribution, and alter the wage they will be paid later by
modulating their search investment on each sub-market. This optimization process makes the
actual wage distribution looks better than the wage oﬀer distribution.
4.3 A Cobb-Douglas example
We end up this section by considering usual explicit forms for the matching function and the
eﬃciency of eﬀort function. In the sequel, we will refer to this particular case as the Cobb-
Douglas example. It appears that with such specifications, the wage oﬀer distribution and the
actual wage distribution are strongly linked with a well-known statistical distribution, the Beta
distribution.
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Proposition 6 The Cobb-Douglas example
Assume that m(θ) = M0θ−α, M0 > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and x(s) = s
γ
1+γ , γ > 0. Let ω =
(w −R) / (y −R) be the normalized wage, and let also HF be the cdf of the normalized wage
oﬀer distribution, while HG is the cdf of the actual normalized wage distribution. Then,
(i) H 0F is the density of a β
¡
1−α
α γ +
1
α + 1, γ + 1
¢
distribution, that is
H 0F (ω) =
(1− ω)
1−α
α γ+
1
α ωγ
B
¡
1−α
α γ +
1
α + 1, γ + 1
¢ , ∀ω ∈ [0, 1]
(ii) H 0G is the density of a β
¡
1−α
α (γ + 1) + 1, γ + 1
¢
distribution, that is
H 0G (ω) =
(1− ω)
1−α
α (γ+1) ωγ
B
¡
1−α
α (γ + 1) + 1, γ + 1
¢ , ∀ω ∈ [0, 1]
where B is the Beta function such that
B (t1 + 1, t2 + 1) =
Z 1
0
(1− ξ)t1 ξt2dξ
The Cobb-Douglas example displays several appealing features. First, we can find a normal-
ization of the wage such that the oﬀer distribution and the actual distribution of such normalized
wage follow simple Beta distributions. Second, the parameters of the Beta distributions only
involve the elasticity of the matching function and the elasticity of eﬀort function. We do not
need to solve the model to find the shape of the diﬀerent wage distributions. Third, the wage
distributions are both single-peaked. Fourth, the wage oﬀer distribution has a flat right tail.
Moreover,
F 00 (R) = γ
(y −R) 1−αα γ+ 1αR y
R(y − ξ)
1−α
α γ+
1
α (ξ −R)γdξ
lim
w→R
(w −R)γ−1
Thus F 00 (R) can either be nil or infinite depending on whether γ is larger or lower than one.
Fifth, we can highlight the parameter circumstances under which the actual wage distribution
has a flat right tail. Indeed, G”(y) = 0 if γ > 2α−11−α and G”(y) = −∞ if γ <
2α−1
1−α . Thus,
the actual wage distribution is right-skewed when the parameters of the matching function and
the search function satisfy γ > 2α−11−α . Right-skewness is not a systematic property but can
exist for a wide range of parameters of the model. Similarly, we can show that G00 (R) = 0
if γ > 1 and G00 (R) = ∞ if γ < 1. Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas case is consistent with an
actual wage distribution characterized by a single peak, a flat right tail, and no left tail. It is
so when 2α−11−α < γ < 1. The following figure depicts the pdf of the wage oﬀer and actual wage
distributions in such a case.
Finally, note the role played by the parameter γ of the eﬃciency of eﬀort function. When
γ tends to 0, the search intensity is the same in each sub-market. The shape of the wage
distribution only reflects the pattern of market tightness by wage. The density of the wage oﬀer
distribution as well as the density of the actual wage distribution are then strictly decreasing in
wage. Conversely, when γ tends to infinity, the eﬃciency of eﬀort function has constant marginal
returns. As a result, workers concentrate their search investment in the sub-market where the
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Figure 2: Wage oﬀer and actual wage distributions - case 2α−11−α < γ < 1
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returns are the highest. Both the wage oﬀer distribution and the actual wage distribution
collapse to a single wage, the only wage oﬀer of the localized search equilibrium.
From an empirical perspective, the Beta distribution should be rejected by the data because
it does not feature the paretian tail typical of empirical wage distributions. Yet, two points
should be made. On the one hand, such Beta distribution is obtained for homogenous firms
and workers. Introducing some heterogeneity on the firm/worker side should make the Cobb-
Douglas example compatible with a paretian-tailed aggregate wage distribution. On the other
hand, the main objective of the Cobb-Douglas example is to illustrate our main results. Other
parametrizations of the eﬀort function can generate wage distributions that fit the empirical wage
distributions better. But, of course, at the cost of losing the simplicity of the Cobb-Douglas
example.
5 Eﬃciency
In this section, we compare the decentralized outcome to the eﬃcient allocation. This comparison
is made under the two cases highlighted so far, i.e. when search is localized and when workers
are ubiquitous. We show that the localized search equilibrium is eﬃcient, while the ubiquitous
search equilibrium is not. We proceed in two steps. First, we compute the eﬃcient allocations
at given number of matching places. Second, we endogenize the number of matching places.
5.1 Eﬃcient allocations at given number of matching places
The main conceptual diﬃculty associated to the eﬃcient allocation relies to the segmentation of
the search market. In the decentralized economy, the search market is segmented by wage: each
wage is associated to an autonomous sub-market. It means that market segmentation requires
wage dispersion. For the planner’s problem, we shall assume that the search place is segmented
i.e., in this sub-section, we suppose as Moen (1997) that the mass-number of matching places
(islands, for short) is given.
Let I be the measure of islands, and i ∈ [0, I] be their index. Under localized search, the
unemployed are bound to search a job on a single matching place. The benevolent planner
chooses the number of unemployed u (i) and the number of vacancies v (i) assigned to island i.
The overall unemployment rate is then given by u =
R I
0 u (i) di. Under ubiquitous search there is
no restriction on the number of prospected places. Therefore on each island all the unemployed,
whose number is still denoted by u, are able to search. In both cases, the planner sets the
search eﬀort s (i) of workers seeking a job on island i. As a consequence, the total cost of search
investment is defined by
R I
0 c (s (i))u (i) di when search is localized and by uc
³R I
0 s (i) di
´
when
search is ubiquitous. The tightness specific to island i is given by θ(i) = v (i) / [x (s(i))u] in case
of ubiquitous search and by θ(i) = v (i) / [x (s(i))u(i)] in case of localized search. In both cases,
the job-finding rate specific to island i is equal to x(s(i))θ(i)m [θ(i)]. When search is ubiquitous,
the dynamic of unemployment is:
u˙ = q (1− u)− u
Z I
0
x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) di (35)
While when search is localized, we have:
u˙(i) = q [1− u(i)]− u(i)x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) di, for all i ∈ [0, I] (36)
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The instantaneous net social products in case of ubiquitous search and in case of localized
search are respectively given by:
ω = y (1− u) + uz − uc
µZ I
0
s (i) di
¶
− hu
IZ
0
θ(i)x(s(i))di
ω = y
µ
1−
Z I
0
u (i) di
¶
+ z
Z I
0
u (i) di− c
µZ I
0
s (i)u(i)di
¶
− h
IZ
0
θ(i)x(s(i))u(i)di
The planner’s problem is to maximize the discounted social product
Z +∞
0
ωe−rtdt with
respect to the relevant variables s(i), θ(i), u (i) or u, and subject to the relevant law of motion,
that is (35) or (36).
The following result describes the stationary solutions of this maximization program for each
search environment.
Proposition 7 The efficient allocations
Under Assumptions A1 and A2, for any given number I of search places
(i) In the localized search case, there is a unique stationary eﬃcient allocation which is such
that s (i) = sl and θ (i) = θl for all i ∈ [0, I], with
h
m
¡
θl
¢ = £1− α ¡θl¢¤ £y − z + c ¡sl¢¤
r + q + x(sl)α
¡
θl
¢
θlm
¡
θl
¢ (37)
c0
³
sl
´
=
α
¡
θl
¢
1− α
¡
θl
¢hθlx0 ³sl´ (38)
(ii) In the ubiquitous search case, there is a unique stationary eﬃcient allocation which is such
that s (i) = su and θ (i) = θu, for all i ∈ [0, I], with
h
m (θu)
=
[1− α (θu)] [y − z + c (Isu)]
r + q + x(su)α (θu) θum (θu) I
(39)
c0 (Isu) =
α (θu)
1− α (θu)hθ
ux0(su) (40)
Comparing (37) and (38) with their decentralized counterpart (17) shows that the localized
search equilibrium is eﬃcient. This result is very similar to Moen (1997). Wage-posting can
thus decentralize the eﬃcient allocation.
When search is ubiquitous, part (ii) of the proposition shows that the planner sets the same
tightness and the same search intensity for all individuals in each island of the interval [0, I].
Both tightness and search intensity are decreasing in the measure I of islands. It follows that the
ubiquitous search equilibrium is ineﬃcient. Consider for instance the case where I = y−R, with
R the equilibrium reservation wage. In this case, the number of opened matching places is the
same in the social optimum and in the decentralized economy. However, the search investment
varies from a sub-market to another in the decentralized economy, while it is constant on each
island at the social optimum.
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The reason of ineﬃciency is simple. Prices serve two purposes in the decentralized economy:
an allocative objective, and an informational objective. According to the allocative objective,
wages must achieve the optimal sharing of output between consumption and vacancy costs
(investment). According to the informational objective, wages must ensure the segmentation of
the search market into a continuum of sub-markets. The number of instruments is thus lower
than the number of objectives and ineﬃciency results.
5.2 On the number of matching places
In this sub-section, we discuss the optimal number of matching places that would be chosen by
the social planner.
Let us begin with the localized search case. Proposition 7 shows that at given number of
matching places, all allocations featuring a search intensity sl and a tightness θl are eﬃcient.
Owing to constant returns to scale in the matching technology and due to the fact that each
worker must be assigned to a single market place, the stationary social product does not depend
on the number of matching places. As a result, the eﬃcient number of matching places is
indeterminate under localized search. It also means that if there were a fixed cost associated to
each market creation, the planner would only create a single matching place.
Now, we turn to the ubiquitous search environment. To simplify the exposition, consider the
case where the discount rate r tends to 0. Then, the eﬃcient allocation maximizes the stationary
social product. The optimal number of market places results from:
max
I≥0
{ω (I) = (1− u (I)) y + u (I) [z − c (Isu (I))]− hu (I) Iθu (I)xu (I)} (41)
where θu and su are defined by Proposition 7, and u (I) = q/ [q + θu (I)m (θu (I))x (su (I)) I].
The derivative of the objective with respect to I is:
ω0 (I) = −∂u (I)
∂I
[y − z + c (Isu (I)) + hIθu (I)xu (I)]−u (I) su (I) c0 (Isu (I))−hu (I) θu (I)x (su (I))
(42)
Using equations (39) and (40), we obtain:
ω0 (I) =
α
1− αhu (I) θ
u (I)x (su (I))
£
1− su (I)x0 (su (I)) /x (su (I))
¤
(43)
which has the sign of the term between brackets. This term is positive for all I, given that su
tends to 0 as I tends to infinity and x is strictly concave. It follows that the optimal number of
matching places is infinite. Indeed, the planner exploits the decreasing marginal returns to search
investment: it opens an infinite number of matching places and sets an arbitrarily small search
intensity in each place. Similarly tightness tends to 0. This result illustrates the ineﬃciency of
the decentralized economy, in which the mass-number of sub-markets is finite. However, it also
highlights the asymmetry between the centralized and the decentralized mechanisms. Indeed,
the planner can achieve the segmentation of the search place without any instrument, while
market segmentation in the decentralized economy requires equilibrium wage dispersion.
To obtain a finite mass-number of islands at the social optimum, we can marginally modify
the technological side of the model. The point is that for the planner, it is always worth
decreasing the search intensity, while simultaneously increasing the number of matching places.
Therefore, we need to alter the search technology, and in particular the eﬃciency of eﬀort
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function. For instance, suppose that x (s) > 0 if and only if s > s0. Or, alternatively, suppose
that x is strictly convex, and then concave. Then, the optimal number of matching places is
finite, and the search intensity is positive in each matching place. The latter simply responds
to the following condition familiar to specialists of the eﬃciency wage literature:
su (I)x0 (su (I)) /x (su (I)) = 1 (44)
Similarly, one can modify the search cost function so that it directly depends on the number of
prospected places. This assumption would indeed limit the optimal number of matching places.
Of course, the decentralized economy would also be aﬀected by such assumptions. The main
diﬀerence would be that both the lower bound and the upper bound of the wage distributions
would become endogenous. Indeed, sub-markets oﬀering wages such that V e (w) is close to V u
(i.e. w close to R), or such that θ (w) is close to 0 (i.e. w close to y) would not be opened in
equilibrium. However, the density of the wage oﬀer distribution, as well as the density of the
actual wage distribution would still be hump-shaped6.
6 Conclusion
This paper oﬀers a search equilibrium model in which firms post wages, and there are homoge-
nous firms and workers. The main originality of the model relies on the working of the search
market. We assume that the search market is segmented by wage, and workers choose the
amount of search eﬀort they spend on each (sub-)market. Workers are thus ubiquitous in the
sense they are not bound to choose one and only one market, but can visit the whole set of
markets opened in equilibrium. The main result is that a non-degenerate equilibrium wage dis-
tribution exists (despite there is no on-the-job search) and can replicate two important properties
of empirical wage distributions, e.g. the distribution can be single-peaked and right-skewed. All
the results are illustrated by a Cobb-Douglas example, in which the wage distribution is a Beta
distribution.
A key feature of our model relies on its simplicity. Its main goal is to show that a rather
natural extension of the usual directed search assumptions (precisely the consideration of ubiq-
uity in market participation) leads to an equilibrium distribution of wages displaying empirically
convincing properties. But, as it stands, our model cannot directly pretend to fit actual wage
distributions. In this respect, we believe that it can be extended in a number of directions that
will make it more relevant from an empirical perspective. The next step is to introduce hetero-
geneity. This can be done by abandoning the assumption according to which the productivity
of a worker is constant once matched to a firm. One could rather assume that there exists
a non-degenerate distribution of output reflecting firm heterogeneity, worker heterogeneity, or
both.
Another area of study concerns the profile of wages. A well-documented property of indi-
vidual wage profile is that it is increasing with tenure. Such a property does not appear in our
model but happens in models with on-the-job search. Thus, another possible step is to add in
our model of ubiquitous search the possibility of searching while employed. Some policy issues
also remain open. Unlike the standard directed search model, the ubiquitous search model ends
up with an equilibrium that is not eﬃcient because, in this context, the wage as too many roles
to play. Hence, other instruments are needed to achieve eﬃciency.
6The model would become more diﬃcult to solve, and thus would lose some of its appealing features.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Lemma 1
We have φ (R,R) ≥ 0, φ (y,R) ≤ 0. Then, note that according to Assumption A2, the matching
function is strictly concave. This implies that [θm (θ)]0 > 0 and [θm (θ)] ” < 0. As [θm(θ)]0 =
m(θ) [1− α(θ)], it comes
[θm(θ)]” = m0 (θ) (1− α)− α0 (θ)m (θ)
= m (θ)
∙
−α (θ)
θ
(1− α (θ))− α0 (θ)
¸
It follows that:
α0 (θ) > −α (θ)
θ
(1− α (θ)) (45)
Now, consider the derivative of function φ with respect to w:
φw (w,R) = α
0 (θ (w)) θ0 (w) (y −R)− 1
with
α (θ (w))
θ0 (w)
θ (w)
= − 1
y − w (46)
Equations (45) and (46) imply that
φw (w,R) <
1− α (θ (w))
y − w (y −R)− 1 =
−φ(w,R)
y −w
This relationship implies that φw (w,R) < 0 whenever φ (w,R) > 0.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i). The formulas appearing in (i) simply replicate relations (8), (11) and (12).
Part (ii). As a preliminary step, let us examine the property of the function σ : [z, y] → R
given by equation (7). Assumption A1 implies that σ (z) = 0 and σ0 (R) > 0. The solving
reduces to find (w∗, R∗) such that
c0 [σ(R)] = x0 [σ(R)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
w −R
r + q
(47)
w = α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R (48)
>From Lemma 1, equation (48) implicitly defines a unique w1 = w1 (R). It is strictly increasing
in R, with z < w1 (z) < w1 (y) = y. Now, consider the following function:
J(w,R) = x0 [σ(R)] θ(w)m (θ(w))
w −R
r + q
− c0 [σ(R)]
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An equilibrium solves K (R) = J(w1(R), R) = 0. Assumptions A1 and A2 together with the
properties of the function σ established below imply that
K (z) = θ(w1 (z))m (θ(w1 (z)))
w1 (z)− z
r + q
lim
R→z
x0 (σ (R)) > 0
K (y) = −c0 (σ (y)) < 0
Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show the function K is strictly decreasing. But,
K 0(R) = w01(R)Jw(w1(R), R) + JR(w1(R), R)
Since Jw(w1(R), R) = 0 for all R, we have
K 0(R) = JR(w1(R), R) =
∙
x”θm (θ)
w1 (R)−R
r + q
− c”
¸
σ0(R)− x0θm(θ) 1
r + q
< 0
It follows that R∗ is unique. Then, w∗ = w1 (R∗) and θ∗ = m−1
³
h(r+q)
y−w
´
are uniquely defined.
C Proof of Proposition 2
The formulas appearing in Proposition 2 have been established in the text. It remains to show
that they define a unique equilibrium. To do this, one can remark that thanks to Assumption
A2 equation (23) defines a unique specific market tightness function θ(w). Then, equation (24)
can be solved in s as a function of w, S and R. Let e (w,R, S) be this unique solution. From
Assumption A1 and the implicit function theorem, the partial derivatives of e (w,R, S) are such
that:
eS =
c”(S)
c0(S)
x0(e)
x”(e)
< 0, eR =
1
w −R
x0(e)
x”(e)
< 0
In addition, lim
S→0
e (w,R, S) <∞, while lim
S→∞
e (w,R, S) = 0.
Now, substitute e (w,R, S) for s(w) in equation (25), and consider the function ψ such that
ψ (R,S) = R− z + c(S)−
Z y
R
x [e (w,R, S)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
dw (49)
The properties of the function ψ are as follows:
lim
S→0
ψ (R,S) = R− z −
Z y
R
x [e (w,R, 0)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
dw
lim
S→∞
ψ (R,S) = +∞
ψS (R,S) = c
0(S)
µ
1−
Z y
R
eSdw
¶
> 0
It follows that there exists a unique S1 ≡ S1 (R) such that ψ (R,S1) = 0 iﬀ lim
S→0
ψ (R,S) ≤ 0.
But,
lim
R→z
ψ (R,S) = c (S)−
Z y
z
x [e (w, z, S)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
dw
lim
R→y
ψ (R,S) = y − z > 0 (50)
ψR (R,S) = 1 +
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
r + q
dw − c0(S)
Z y
R
eRdw > 0
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Therefore, there exists a unique eR ∈ (z, y) such that lim
S→0
ψ (R,S) ≤ 0 if and only if R ≤ eR.
To summarize, equation (25) implicitly defines S1 (R) for all R ∈ [z, y], with
S1
³ eR´ = 0 and S01 (R) < R yR eRdw1− R yR eSdw < 0 (51)
Moreover, when e (w,R, S) is substituted for s(w) in equation (26), we obtain another equation
defining a unique S as a function of R. We call this function S2 (R). Diﬀerentiating this latter
equation with respect to R gives:µ
1−
Z y
R
eSdw
¶
dS
dR
= −e(R,R, S) +
Z y
R
eRdw
Assumption A2 and equation (24) imply that e(R,R, S) = 0. Consequently
S02 (R) =
R y
R eRdw
1−
R y
R eSdw
< 0 (52)
So far, we have shown that S01(R) < S02(R) < 0. In addition, S2(y) = 0, which implies that
S2
³ eR´ > S1 ³ eR´ = 0. Lastly, S1(z) and S2(z) are given by:
S2(z) =
Z y
z
e [w, z, S2(z)] dw
c [S1(z)] = c
0 [S1(z)]
Z y
z
x [e (w, z, S1(z))]
x0 [e (w, z, S1(z))]
dw (53)
Assumption A1 implies that x (e) /x0 (e) > e and c(s)/c0(s) < s, therefore (53) gives
S1(z) >
c [S1(z)]
c0 [S1(z)]
>
Z y
z
e [w, z, S1(z)] dw
which proves that S1(z) > S2(z). All these properties of the functions S1(R) and S2(R) entail
that they cross once at a point such that R∗ ∈ (z, y). Thus, the equilibrium values of R and S
are unique. It follows that the equilibrium functions θ∗(w) and s∗(w) given respectively by (23)
and (24) are also unique.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Relation (23) and Assumption A2 imply that θ(y) = 0. Therefore, relation (24) and Assumption
A1 imply that s(y) = 0. Furthermore, (23) shows that θ(R) is finite and (24) and Assumption
A1 then entails that s(R) = 0. Since s is continuous and s (w) > 0 for all w ∈ (R, y), the
function s is not monotonous. Then, s0 (w) is continuous and has the sign of φ (w,R). The
result follows from Lemma 1.
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E Proof of Proposition 4
Part (i). According to proposition 3, one has s (R) = s (y) = 0. Remembering that θ(y) = 0
and that θ(R) is finite, relation (29) arrives at F 0 (R) = F 0 (y) = 0. The result follows from the
facts that F 0 is continuous and F 0 (w) > 0 for all w ∈ (R, y).
Part (ii). Note that F 00 (w) has the sign of ψ(w,R). Hence, each root of the equation
ψ (w,R) = 0 corresponds to a point where F 00 (w) = 0. If Assumption A4 holds, the equation
ψ(w,R) = 0 has a unique root and the wage oﬀer distribution is ∩-shaped.
Part (iii). Equation (31) shows that:
F”(y) = lim
w→y
1
α (θ (w))
F 0(w)
y − w {[α (θ (w))− 1] γ (w)− 1}
Using (29) and (23), one arrives at:
F”(y) =
u
vh(r + q)
lim
w→y
θ (w)m (θ (w))x (s (w))
α (θ (w))
{[α (θ (w))− 1] γ (w)− 1}
The result follows from the facts that θ (w)m (θ (w)) and x [s (w)] are equal to zero when w → y.
F Proof of Proposition 5
Part (i). As G0(w) = vF 0(w)m [θ(w)] /λu, part (i) of Proposition 4 implies that G0 (R) =
G0 (y) = 0. The result follows from the fact that G0 (w) > 0 for all w ∈ (R, y) and the continuity
of G0.
Part (ii). As m [θ(w)] = h(r+q)y−w — see (23) —, relation (32) becomes:
G0(w) =
v
λu
h(r + q)
y − w F
0(w)
Let us denote by w0 the unique wage such that vλu
h(r+q)
y−w0 = 1. A priori, w0 can be greater or
smaller than R. Let us suppose first that w0 ≥ R. One has G0(w) < F 0(w) for w < w0 and
G0(w) > F 0(w) for w > w0. Therefore, when w < w0 one has:
G(w) =
Z w
R
G0(ξ)dξ <
Z w
R
F 0(ξ)dξ = F (w)
While, when w > w0 one has:
1−G(w) =
Z y
w
G0(ξ)dξ >
Z y
w
F 0(ξ)dξ = 1− F (w) (54)
Hence, one always has G(w) < F (w) when w0 ≥ R.
Now, let us assume that w0 < R. Then, one has G0(w) > F 0(w) for all w ≥ R, and (54)
holds for all w ≥ R. Consequently, G(w) < F (w) when w0 < R.
Part (iii). G00 (w) has the sign of χ(w,R). Hence, each root of the equation χ(w,R) = 0
corresponds to a point where F 00 (w) = 0. If Assumption A5 holds, the equation χ(w,R) = 0
has a unique root and the actual wage distribution is ∩-shaped.
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G Proof of Proposition 6
Part (i). In the Cobb-Douglas case, equation (31) becomes:
F”(w)
F 0(w)
=
γ [αy + (1− α)R− w]
α(y − w)(w −R) −
1
α(y − w)
Integrating this equation with the condition
R y
R F
0(w)dw = 1 yields:
F 0(w) =
(y − w) 1−αα γ+ 1α (w −R)γR y
R(y − ξ)
1−α
α γ+
1
α (ξ −R)γdξ
,∀w ∈ [0, y]
The cdf of the normalized wage satisfies
HF (ω) = Pr{w −Ry −R ≤ ω} = Pr{w ≤ R+ ω(y −R)} = F [R+ ω(y −R)]
Therefore, H 0F (ω) = (y −R)F 0 [R+ ω(y −R)], and the result follows.
Part (ii). Using the definitions of the functions φ(w,R) and ψ(w,R), equation (34) becomes:
G00 (w)
G0 (w)
=
γ(y −R)
(y −w)(w −R) −
1 + γ − α
α(y − w)
Integrating this equation with the condition
R y
RG
0(w)dw = 1 yields
G0(w) =
(y − w)
(1+γ)(1−α)
α (w −R)γR y
R(y − ξ)
(1+γ)(1−α)
α (ξ −R)γdξ
(55)
The cdf of the actual normalized wage is such that
HG(ω) = Pr{w −Ry −R ≤ ω} = Pr{w ≤ R+ ω(y −R)} = G [R+ ω(y −R)]
Therefore one gets H 0G(ω) = (y −R)G0 [R+ ω(y −R)], and the result follows.
H Proof of Proposition 7
Part (i). Let ρ (i) denote the co-state variable related to (36). The current-valued Hamiltonian
of the problem is:
H = ωe−rt +
IZ
0
ρ(i) {q [1− u(i)]− u(i)x(s(i))θ(i)mθ(i)} di
The first-order conditions are:
∂H
∂s(i)
=
∂H
∂θ(i)
= 0,
∂H
∂u(i)
= −ρ˙(i)
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The condition ∂H/∂s(i) = 0 gives£
c0(s(i)) + hθ(i)x0(s(i))
¤
e−rt + ρ(i)x0(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) = 0, ∀i[0, I] (56)
Similarly, the condition ∂H/∂θ(i) = 0 gives
he−rt = −ρ(i)m (θ(i)) [1− α (θ(i))] , ∀i[0, I] (57)
The Euler equations read as:
[−y + z − c(s(i))− hθ(i)x(s(i))s(i)] e−rt − ρ(i) [q + x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i))] = −ρ˙(i) (58)
Diﬀerentiating (57) with respect to time, and taking the result at the stationary state (where
θ˙(i) = 0), entails ρ˙(i) = −rρ(i). Equations (58) and 57) then give
h
m (θ(i))
=
[1− α (θ(i))] [y − z + c (s(i))]
r + q + x(s(i))α (θ(i)) θ(i)m (θ(i))
(59)
Similarly, equations (56) and (57) give
c0 (s(i)) =
α (θ(i))
1− α (θ(i))hθ(i)x
0(s(i)) (60)
Equations (59) and (60) form a system of two equations with two unknowns s(i) and θ(i). These
conditions are similar to the localized search equilibrium given by the system (17). Therefore a
unique solution results and s(i) = sl, while θ(i) = θl, for all i[0, I]. Finally, note that the Euler
conditions are satisfied for all u (i) ≥ 0, so that if I were also a control variable, the number of
opened matching places would be indeterminate.
Part (ii). Let us denote by ρ the costate variable related to (35), the Hamiltonian of the
problem is:
H = ωe−rt + ρ
⎡
⎣q(1− u)− u
IZ
0
x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) di
⎤
⎦ (61)
The first-order conditions are
∂H
∂s(i)
=
∂H
∂θ(i)
= 0, ∀i[0, I], ∂H
∂u
= −ρ˙ (62)
The f.o.c. with respect to s (i) implies
⎡
⎣c0
⎛
⎝
IZ
0
s(i)di
⎞
⎠+ hθ(i)x0(s(i))
⎤
⎦ e−rt + ρx0(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) = 0, ∀i[0, I] (63)
Similarly, the f.o.c. with respect to θ (i) implies
he−rt = −ρm (θ(i)) [1− α (θ(i))] , ∀i[0, I] (64)
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The Euler equation reads
⎡
⎣−y + z − c
⎛
⎝
IZ
0
s(i)di
⎞
⎠− h
IZ
0
θ(i)x(s(i))di
⎤
⎦ e−rt − ρ
⎡
⎣q +
IZ
0
x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) di
⎤
⎦ = −ρ˙
(65)
Equation (64) shows that θ(i) does not depend upon i, hence θ(i) = θu for all i ∈ [0, I]. Then,
eliminating ρ between (63) and (64) arrives at:
c0
⎛
⎝
IZ
0
s(i)di
⎞
⎠ = α (θ)
1− α (θ)hθx
0(s(i)) (66)
This equation shows that s(i) does not depend on i, hence s(i) = su, for all i ∈ [0, I]. This last
equation gives
c0 (Isu) =
α (θu)
1− α (θu)hθ
ux0(su) (67)
Diﬀerentiating (64) with respect to time, and taking the result at the stationary state (where
θ˙ = 0), entails ρ˙ = −rρ. The Euler equation (65) combined with (64) then gives
h
m (θu)
= (1− α (θu)) y − z + c (Is
u)
r + q + Ix(su)α (θu) θum (θu)
(68)
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